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Abstract. The purpose of the thesis is to introduce, build and test HMM as a method of detecting 
suspicious financial transactions that might be correlated with money laundering. HMM is a 
statistical Markov model in which the system being modelled is assumed to be Markov process 
with unobserved (i.e., hidden) states. These hidden states however generate observable 
outcomes. HMM fits the context of transaction monitoring in the fight against money laundering 
as the intent of a transaction (part of money laundering scheme or not) is and only some 
parameters of the transaction can be observed. The model was built and tested on artificial 
datasets provided by Salv Technologies and commonly used k-means clustering model was 
chosen for comparison. Analysis and testing showed that overall, HMM outperforms k-means 
clustering. Based on analysis, it can be concluded that in essence, HMM can be used in 
transaction monitoring but getting high precision needs expert knowledge and practical testing. 
A brief overview of money laundering, anomaly detection methods and HMM are given. 
Empirical part includes application of HMM on 3 different study cases using R software. 
CERCS research specialization: P160 Statistics, operations research, programming, actuarial 
mathematics. 
Keywords: hidden Markov model, HMM, money laundering, anomaly detection. 
 
 




Lühikokkuvõte. Lõputöö eesmärk on tutvustada, ehitada ja testida varjatud Markovi mudelit 
(hidden Markov model - HMM) kui meetodit kahtlaste tehingute tuvastamiseks, mis võivad olla 
seotud rahapesuga. HMM modelleerib süsteemi, kus esmalt eeldame Markovi protsessi, mis on 
vaatlejale varjatud. Selle varjatud protsessi seisund genereerib aga vaadeldavaid väärtuseid. 
HMM sobitub finantstehingute seire olukorda rahapesu tuvastamiseks, nimelt tehingu eesmärk 
(panna toime rahapesu või mitte) on varjatud ja finantsasutus näeb ainult loetud tehingu 
parameetreid. Mudel ehitati ja testiti Salv Technologies'i kunstlike andmete põhjal ning 
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võrdlemiseks valiti tavaliselt kasutatav k-keskmiste (k-means) klasterdamine.  Testimised ja 
analüüs näitasid, et HMM edestab k-keskmiste klasterdamis meetodit. Järeldusena võib öelda, 
et olemuslikult sobib HMM finantstehingute seiresse, aga täpsuse saavutamiseks on vaja 
valdkonna teadmisi ja praktilist testimist. Lõputöös antakse ülevaade rahapesust, käsitletakse 
anomaaliate avastamise meetodeid, HMM metoodikat. Praktilises osas käsitletakse HMM-i 
rakendamist andmekogumites kolmel erineval juhtumil. kasutades tarkvara R. 
CERCS teaduseriala: P160 Statistika, operatsioonianalüüs, programmeerimine, finants-ja 
kindlustusmatemaatika. 
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Money Laundering is the illegal process of concealing the origins of the money 
obtained illegally by passing it through a complex sequence of banking transfers or 
commercial transactions (UNODC, 2021). Almost all criminals and criminal 
organizations that deal with human trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal arms 
trafficking, fraud, scams etc. on a larger scale need ways to “legitimize” their 
earnings. Illegally avoiding taxation of legally obtained finances can also be referred 
to as money laundering. 
No-one can be sure when money laundering first began. However, we can be 
certain that it has been done for several thousand years. In “Lords of the Rim” 
Sterling Seagrave explains how, in 2000  B.C.  China, merchants would hide their 
wealth from rulers who would simply take it off them and banish them. In addition 
to hiding it, they would move it and invest it in businesses in remote provinces or 
even outside of China (Morris-Cotterill, 2001). 
Fight against money laundering aims to hinder, or at least make it very difficult for 
criminals to legitimize their earnings and thus make the illegal venture less 
appealing, save potential future crime victims, and make everyday lives of people 
safer. Due to the importance of detecting money laundering, nearly all 
international organizations urge the state or private companies to take actions 
and help them to prevent money laundering. 
  
The Bank of International Settlements (BIS), OECD, the G8, G20, EU members’ 
finance and justice ministers, several departments in UN, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) are the main participants in 
regulatory efforts designed to reduce and assess money laundering. (Unger, 2007) 
One of the most influential organizations tasked with preventing money laundering 
in a large scale is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In response to mounting 
concern over money laundering, FATF was established by the G-7 Summit in Paris 
in 1989 to develop a coordinated international provision. One of the first tasks of 
FATF was to develop a list of recommendations, which establish measures for 
national governments what they should implement to fight effectively against 
money laundering (FATF, 2021).  
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To understand the importance of the fight against money laundering, it is good to 
get an idea of the scale of criminal finances being laundered through banking 
systems. According to a study conducted by United Nations Office on Drug and 
Crime (UNODC) in 2009 it is estimated that the overall amount of criminal proceeds 
generated in 2009, excluding those derived from tax evasion, may have been 
approximately $2.1 trillion, or 3.6 per cent of global GDP in that year (UNODC, 
2021). Of that total, the proceeds of transnational organized crime - such as drug 
trafficking, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and small arms smuggling - may have 
amounted to 1.5 per cent of global GDP, and 70 per cent of those proceeds were 
likely to have been laundered through the financial system. 
According to Sullivan (2015, pp 15-16), FATF (2021), there are basically three 
methods to make the money clean: 
• Using the legitimate financial system (for example, moving money from bank 
to bank,  or to money service businesses (MSB-s));  
• Physically moving the money (for example, transporting bulk cash via 
shipments across the border); 
• Physically moving goods through the trade system. 
The thesis focuses on the 1st option-and more specifically on detection of suspicious 
activities (that might be related to money laundering) through the financial 
institutions. Emphasis goes on suspicious since financial institutions can only spot 
signals of money laundering, formal investigations can only be done by the state 
law enforcement and fixations of money laundering can only be done by the court 
system. Financial institutions can however manage their risks and deny transferring 
the finances even based on suspicions. 
 
In the past few decades, the scale of money laundering has increased because of 
digitalization and automation of international money transfers. This makes it a lot 
easier for criminals to transfer money to all sides of the world through different 
accounts within a short amount of time. But on the positive side, it has become a 
lot easier to check, monitor and to detect illicit international money transfers and 
unusual activities. (Muller et al, 2007). Detection of unusual activities and illicit 




Transaction monitoring - i.e., setting out to find patterns and signs of suspicious or 
risky behavior – is a practical way of tracking down suspicious activities that might 
be associated with money laundering. Many financial institutions have their own 
internal way to define, categorize ongoing transactions as suspicious or normal. 
Vast majority of financial institutions use rule-based approach such as setting a 
limit on daily, weekly, monthly incoming, or outgoing transactions amount. If the 
set limit is passed, then the activity is investigated in more detail. One of the main 
limitations of this approach is that it can cause unnecessary false alerts. Machine 
learning methods, such as anomaly detection approaches in statistics investigated 
by Hawkins (1980) and anomaly techniques to detect credit card fraud used by 
Aleskerov et al (1997) can be applied to trail the features of a transaction. 
The thesis considers Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to detect suspicious 
transactions which might be associated with money laundering. HMM itself 
includes hidden states which perfectly suits to apply on transaction monitoring 
process. The intent of the transaction – either conduct an act of money laundering 
or a  normal transaction - is unknown. These hidden states are assumed to depend 
only on the previous transaction (Markov property). According to hidden state, 
observable variable values are generated, like transaction amount, currency, time 
of the transaction, counterparty etc. Several auxiliary variables were considered 
such as sum of total transaction amount within one day and number of transactions 
within one day for each bank customer at the time of the transaction. For the 
model, based on the observable variables, a single observable variable was 
constructed to classify a transaction as either low risk, medium risk, or high risk. 
Then HMM is used to predict the hidden state with the help of the observable 
variable. As mentioned earlier, then a financial institution can only detect 
suspicious actions of their customers, not actual intent of money laundering or 
illicit behavior. Therefore, the hidden states are relaxed to suspicious and normal. 
 
The goal of the thesis is to introduce HMM, build a model to detect suspicious 
transactions, and test it on 3 separate study cases based on artificial data. To 
compare the results of HMM, another method, the k-means clustering was chosen.  
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The thesis is separated into 6 sections. Section 2 defines general overview of money 
laundering, its phases, anomaly detection methods and different applications of 
HMM. Section 3 covers the methodology part. This section focuses on the 
theoretical aspects of HMM and necessary information is given that is needed in 
the empirical part. A brief introduction to k-means clustering is also provided in this 
section. Section 4 covers the empirical study. Section 5 discusses the results, and 
finally, conclusions are given. 
The analysis was carried out with R software (version  4.0.2) (R Core Team, 2020). 
Packages such as data.table (Dowle et al (2021)), dplyr (Wickham et al, 2021, 
package version 1.0.5), HMM (Himmelmann, 2010, package version 1.0) were used 



















2. Literature review 
Literature review part gives an overview about money laundering and its phases, 
then anomaly detection methods and their importance are highlighted, finally, 
HMM is described as one of the anomaly detection methods. 
 
2.1 Money laundering and its phases 
 
According to Cox (2014, pp 6), money laundering can be defined as the process 
when a person who has received some form of ill-gotten gains, will seek to ensure 
that they can use these funds without people realizing that these are obtained by 
the result of inappropriate behavior. To do this they will need to disguise the 
proceeds such that the original source of the proceeds is hidden and therefore the 
funds themselves appear to be legitimate. 
There are 3 cycles of money laundering and Cox (2014, pp 15) defines them as 
follows: 
Placement – initial proceeds enter the banking system at a perceived point of 
weakness. 
Layering – the funds are moved around such that the initial source of the funds 
is disguised. 
Integration – the funds are eventually reintegrated into the mainstream banking 
system as clean funds. 
 




                 Figure 1. The money laundering cycle, Madinger (2012, pp 8). 
 
In this three-stage process, it is not an easy task to detect “dirty” money. One 
common reason of difficulty to detect money laundering is that it is related to other 
crimes. Whenever multiple counts of money laundering and interrelated criminal 
activity become spliced, a complex network of illicit activity is created and that is 
extremely hard to fully track and break down. Many financial institutions, 
businesses, governments set controls to prevent money laundering. These controls 
are summarized under the name of Anti-Money Laundering (AML). AML is a set of 
policies, procedures and technologies that try to prevent money laundering. It is 
implemented within government systems and large financial institutions to 
monitor potentially fraudulent activity. 
According to Sullivan (2015) generally there are 3 goals of quality AML programs: 
• To prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. 
• To report suspicious activities. 
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• To train all personnel on legal and internal procedures. 
 
Technological innovations such as applying anomaly detection methods have made 
it substantially easier to detect when the financial system is being abused, as well 
as to gather information about the individuals who are abusing it. Manually 
searching for data and monitoring accounts is time-consuming, inefficient, and 
often ineffective. Fortunately, screening systems have replaced this old-fashioned 
process, and have made it easier than ever before to monitor transactions of clients 
and determine if someone is trying to launder money.  
 
 
2.2 Anomaly detection methods 
 
To use anomalous behavior detection methods, it should first be underlined how 
we define what is called “normal” behavior. As the anomaly itself cannot be 
described straightforwardly, it needs a model or a system that should clearly define 
what it will refer as a “normal” pattern. Then the model will be compared with 
expected (normal) values.  
According to Dunning and Friedman (2014, pp 14) the key steps in anomaly 
detection are: 
• What is normal? 
• What will you measure to identify things that are “far” from normal? 
• How far is “far” if something is to be considered anomalous? 
We can classify many transactions as anomalous. In the context of a banking 
system, Cox (2014, pp 226-227) brings out some examples of suspicious 
transactions or actions: 
• A customer opens a greater number of different accounts than would be 
expected for the type of business they are purportedly conducting and/or 
frequently transfers funds among those accounts.  
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•  A customer’s corporate account(s) has deposits or withdrawals primarily in 
cash rather than online transfers. 
• Generally, if a customer frequently makes large dollar transactions (such as 
deposits, withdrawals, or purchases of monetary instruments) without an 
explanation how they will be used in the business, or the purchases allegedly 
are for a business that generally does not deal in large amounts of cash, then 
investigation will be required. 
• If a business that does not normally generate overseas currency suddenly 
starts to make numerous currency transactions (i.e., a sanitation company 
that makes numerous deposits of cash), then this should be identified and 
reviewed. 
• If a business owner, such as an owner who has only one store, makes several 
deposits the same day using different bank branches, then this will be highly 
unusual. 
According to Mehrotra et al (2017), there are three desired goals when applying an 
anomaly detection algorithm: 
1. Correct detection - Detected abnormalities in data correspond exactly to 
abnormalities in the process.  
2. False positives - The process continues to be normal, but unexpected data 
values are observed, e.g., due to intrinsic system noise.  
3. False negatives - The process becomes abnormal, but the consequences are not 
registered in the abnormal data, e.g., due to the signal of the abnormality being 
insufficiently strong compared to the noise in the system. 
In practice it is nearly impossible to reach the maximum of all goals and detect 
every abnormality. General approach here is to minimize the false positives and 
false negatives. 
According to Alla et al (2019) an anomaly can be split into 3 general categories:  
• Data point-based anomalies 
• Context-based anomalies 
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• Pattern-based anomalies 
Main idea of data point-based anomalies that they are not expected to have in data 
set. These types of anomalies can be found wherever a data set of values exists. An 
example of this is a data set of thyroid diagnostic values, where most of the data 
points are indicative of normal thyroid functionality (The thyroid gland is a small 
butterfly-shaped gland in the neck. One of its main functions is to produce 
hormones that help regulate the body's metabolism). In this case, anomalous 
values represent sick thyroids. While they are not necessarily outliers, they have a 
low probability of existing when considering all the normal data. 
Context-based anomalies consist of data points that might seem normal firstly, but 
if the context is considered then can be underlined as anomalies. For example, a 
person who makes a high volume of purchases towards Black Friday (Black Friday 
refers to the day after the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday, it is typically a day full of 
special shopping deals and heavy discounts and is considered the beginning of the 
holiday shopping season) is not flagged because it is typical for people to do so 
around that time. However, if the purchases are made in a month where it is out 
of place given previous purchase history, it would be flagged as an anomaly. 
Lastly, third group of anomalies are the pattern-based anomalies which as the 
name suggests deviate from its long-term patterns or trends. For example, in the 
context of financial transactions, if a person usually has been withdrawing her 
money from a bank on a  specific day each month for a long time, suddenly starts 
to withdraw on unusual days, then this action can be considered as anomaly as it 
breaks the long-term pattern. 
According to Alla et al (2019), there are three kinds of styles of anomaly detection: 
• Supervised anomaly detection 
• Semi-supervised anomaly detection 
• Unsupervised anomaly detection.  
Supervised anomaly detection is a technique which can be applied to the training 
data where both anomalies and normal data point are identified beforehand. 
Basically, model knows which data point is normal and which one is not. An 
example of this can be a temporal convolutional network (Alla et al, 2019) 
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If the training data is partially identified, then semi-supervised anomaly detection 
techniques can be applied. For example, initial conditions can be set that how a 
normal data point looks like in the dataset. Examples of models that can use semi-
supervised learning for anomaly detection include autoencoders. 
If training data is not labelled, and data points are classified as “anomaly” or 
“normal”  after the training process, then it is referred to as unsupervised anomaly 
detection. Isolation forest is an example of technique that can be applied on 
unsupervised dataset. 
Different anomaly techniques are used to find out frauds in credit card and 
insurance areas which are the closest areas to money laundering. Aleskerov et al 
(1997), Ghosh and Reilly (1994), Dorronsoro et al (1997) investigated neural 
networks techniques to unveil credit card frauds. Brause et al (1999) and Bolton 
(2001) used rule-based systems clustering methods for detection of credit card 
frauds. Neural network-based techniques have been applied to identify insurance 
claim fraud (Li et al ,2008, Brockett et al, 1994), but generally this kind of fraud is 
handled as a generic activity monitoring problem (Fawcett et al, 1997). 
HMM can also be particularly useful for detecting anomalous behavior, for 
example, Ourston et al (2003) have proposed the application of Hidden Markov 
Models in detecting multistage network attacks. 
 
2.3 Hidden Markov model 
 
Among anomaly detection methods, HMM is less used, but it offers many 
advantages, especially, in the context of financial transaction monitoring. 
HMM has a finite set of states, each of which is associated with a (generally 
multidimensional) probability distribution. Transitions between the states are 
defined by a set of probabilities called transition probabilities. In a particular state 
an outcome or observation is generated, according to the associated probability 
distribution. It is only the outcome, not the state, that is visible to an external 
observer and therefore states are “hidden” to the outside, hence the name is 
hidden Markov model. 
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HMM has been used to successfully to model many real-world processes. The two 
hierarchy-level structure is the main idea and advantage of HMM, it can be used to 
model much more complicated stochastic processes than traditional Markov 
model.  
 
Mhamane and Lobo (2012) introduced HMM to detect internet banking fraud in 
their article. They use Baum-Welch algorithm to estimate HMM parameters like 
state and transition probabilities but in the paper no real simulation is given as it is 
mainly focused on theoretically explaining feasibility of HMM. Jadhav and Bandari 
(2012) implemented HMM on credit card transaction. They found that HMM 
helped to reduce the number of false negatives. 
 
Kasianova (2020) applied HMM on defining a type of transaction of each client  as 
either being “suspicious” or “normal”. HMM was applied for each user separately 
and observable variable was set to get value either high risk or low risk. It was 
























In this section theoretical aspects of HMM are discussed, k-means - the comparison 
method is introduced, and lastly, to compare the results of both models, quality 
assessment metrics are provided. 
 
3.1.  Hidden Markov models 
 
Part of the HMM is a sequence of states that assume the Markov chain property to 
hold, so before proceeding with HMM, the concept of Markov chain is introduced. 
Then HMM, its properties and the algorithm used to estimate transition and 
emission probabilities - Baum-Welch and Viterbi algorithm - are provided. 
 
3.1.1 Markov chain and its properties 
 
Markov chain is named after Prof. Andrei A. Markov (1856-1922) who first 
published his results in 1906. Theoretically, he showed that the weak law of large 
numbers and other important results of the calculus of probability were valid not 
only for independent events, as assumed by classical stochastics, but also for 
samples that were connected in simple or multiple chains. It is widely applied on 
different problems in game theory, genetics, social science, finance, economics, 
computer science etc. Being the simplest Markov model, Markov chain concerns 
about a sequence of random variables, which are related to the states of stochastic 
process, in such a way that the state at one time depends only on the one in the 
previous time (Ching et al, 2013). The state space, or set of all possible states, can 
be anything: letters, numbers, weather conditions, baseball scores, or stock 
performances. 
A basic example is the two-state process. For example, let us assume that 𝑆 =
{𝑆1, 𝑆2} is the 2-state process (takes values of (0,1)) based on stock market  trend. 
𝑆1 =  0 if stock market exhibits bear market (bear market- downward market 
trend, decrease in stock prices) or 𝑆2 = 1 stock market exhibits bull market (bull 
market- upward market trend, increase in stock prices) in time instants - 𝑡 =
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1,2, . . 𝑛. As we have only 2 states and future market trend depends only on current 
state, then it is a Markov chain process. We can easily set up transition 
probabilities: 
            𝜋11 = 𝛼 then 𝜋12 = 1 − 𝛼 and accordingly 𝜋21 = 𝛽 and 𝜋22 = 1 − 𝛽  
where 𝛼 and 𝛽 represent the initial probabilities in each state (𝛼 if stock market is 
bull market and 𝛽 if stock market is bear market). So, we can develop one step 
transition matrix 𝑃 based on this information: 
𝐴 = {𝜋𝑖𝑗 } = (
𝛼 1 − 𝛼
𝛽 1 − 𝛽
) 
 
Consider a more general system which may be described at any time as being in 
any of a set of N states, 𝑆1 , 𝑆2 … 𝑆𝑁.  If time instants associated with state changes 
are denoted as 𝑡 = 1,2, . . 𝑛, then actual state as time 𝑡 can be marked as 𝑞𝑡. 
According to the Markov chain property, being in actual state qt depends only on 
previous state 𝑞𝑡−1. Then the relationship can be expressed as below: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =  𝑃 [ 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑆𝑗|𝑞𝑡−1 = 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑞𝑡−2 =  𝑆𝑘, . . ] = 𝑃[𝑞𝑡 = 𝑆𝑗|𝑞𝑡−1 = 𝑆𝑖] 
 
We can generalize relationships in transition probability matrix: 
 






where probabilities 𝑎𝑖𝑗  have properties 𝑎𝑖𝑗  ≥ 0 and ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 = 1. We assume that 
transition probabilities do not depend on time 𝑡, i.e., we have a homogeneous 
Markov chain. 
 
As we have discussed in Markov chain, each observable state indicates certain 
process. But there is a special form of Markov model in which it is not possible 
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directly observe the true state. In this type of model only some indications can be 
measured about the true state and based on that true state or hidden state can be 
determined. This special type of model is called Hidden Markov model as the true 
states are hidden.  
 
 
3.1.2 Overview of Hidden Markov model 
 
Let us present an example of where HMM can be fitted. Jonas and Elvis are pen 
pals and constantly write to each other. Assume that based on weather Jonas 
decides to wear clothes with certain color - either black or white. His friend Elvis 
due to pandemic is stuck in another country and does not know about the weather 
condition where Jonas lives. Elvis only knows about his color preferences. So how 
must Elvis figure out the weather condition, based on information of Jonas’s 
decision on color?   
Let us give some initial, transition probabilities and figure out how Hidden Markov 
model can be built. 
 
Firstly, there are hidden states as being weather conditions: 
• 𝑆1 - sunny 
• 𝑆2 - rainy  
Secondly, based on Markov property, current state depends on only previous one, 
it is possible to develop transition probabilities between states. For example, 
consider that Elvis knows that if today is sunny then tomorrow will be sunny with 
probability 0.8 and rainy 0.2; if weather is rainy today then tomorrow will be rainy 










As was stated above, Elvis knows Jonas’s decision on color: if it is sunny then Jonas 
wears white clothes with probability 0.7 and black 0.3. If the weather is rainy then 
Jonas decides to wear black cloth with probability 0.6 and white with probability 
0.4. These probabilities are called emission probabilities which indicate 
probabilities of observations are emitted from hidden states. We can express those 







And lastly, Elvis knows about the weather condition on that day with probabilities 
called initial probabilities: 1st day probability of being rainy is 0.4 and sunny is 0.6.  
 
𝜋 =  {𝜋1 = 0.6; 𝜋2 = 0.4} 
 
Considering all these probabilities, Jonas’s decision on what color clothes he wore 
each day, then Elvis can calculate what’s today’s weather. 
 






















Figure 2. Visualization of HMM (source: Author) 
 
As mentioned above HMM describes the process where it is not possible directly 
to figure out the needed outcome. But in each state like in Markov model certain 
processes could be detected and main role and usefulness of HMM is the deriving 
of outcome from this complex puzzle. In certain fields HMM suits very well to the 
case, for example, in financial transaction monitoring in the context of money 
laundering detection. It is not possible to directly say that a transaction is suspicious 
or not. But based on features or parameters of the transaction it is possible to 
estimate if it was done with ill-intentions in mind. This translates to the observer - 














3.1.3 Elements of a Hidden Markov Model 
 
Above example showed the concept of a hidden Markov Model. We now can 
formally indicate and define the elements of HMM. 
According to Rabiner (1989) HMM is specified by the following: 
1. 𝑁, the number of hidden states in the model. As we saw from above 
example that although the states are hidden, they are associated with 
certain kinds of indicators. In our example those indicators were weather 
states – sunny or rainy. It is much alike the ergodic model in essence that 
states are interrelated (next day’s weather condition depends on previous 
day’s weather and if today is sunny most like tomorrow will be sunny as well 
or vice versa). Individual states are denoted as 𝑆 =  {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 … 𝑆𝑛} and state 
at the time 𝑡 as 𝑞𝑡. 
2. 𝑀 represents the number of distinct observation symbols. In our example, 
there were only 2 of them as color preference either black or white. Distinct 
observations can be denoted as 𝑉 =  {𝑣1, 𝑣2 … , 𝑣𝑀}. 
3. The state transition probability distribution 𝐴 = {𝑎𝑖𝑗}, where 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =  𝑃(𝑞𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑗  | 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖),         1 ≤  𝑖  ≤  𝑁 
 
For the special case in which any state can reach to any other one with single 
step, then 𝑎𝑖𝑗 >  0 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗. If state 𝑆𝑗 cannot be reached from state 𝑆𝑖 in a single 
step, then  𝑎𝑖𝑗 =  0. 
4. The emission probability distribution (or observation symbol probability 
distribution) in state 𝑆𝑗 , 𝐵 =  { 𝑏𝑗(𝑘)}, where 
 
𝑏𝑗(𝑘) =  𝑃(𝑣𝑘 𝑎𝑡  𝑡|𝑞𝑡  =  𝑆𝑗),                  1 ≤  𝑗  ≤  𝑁,     1 ≤  𝑘 ≤  𝑀. 
 
5. The initial state probabilities at the start of the process are 𝜋 = {𝜋 𝑖}, where 
 




Considering all these elements of 𝑁, 𝑀, 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝜋, then the defined HMM 
generates an observation sequence- 𝑂 =  𝑜1𝑜2 … 𝑜𝑇, as below, where 𝑜𝑖 
represent one of the symbols from 𝑉, and 𝑇 is the number of observations: 
• Choose an initial state. 
• Set 𝑡 = 1. 
• Choose observation according to the emission probability distribution in 
state 𝑆𝑖. 
• Transit to a new state 𝑞𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑗 according to transition probability 
distribution for 𝑆𝑖. 
• Set 𝑡 = 𝑡 + 1; keep going until 𝑡 reaches 𝑇. 
For simplicity based on the elements of HMM, we will use from now on a compact 
notation for defining the complete parameters of HMM as below: 
𝜆 =  (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) 
 
According to Jurafsky and Martin (2008) there are 3 assumptions of HMM: 
• Markov Assumption - Simply predicting future the past does not matter, only 
present is encountered. 
• Independent Assumption - Probability of an out observation 𝑜𝑖 depends only 
on the state 𝑞𝑖 that produced the observation, not any other state or other 
observations. 
• The Stationary Assumption - State transition probabilities are independent 
of the actual time which the transition takes place. So, transition 
probabilities are fixed. 
 
3.1.4 Problems of HMM and computation algorithms 
 
As the structure of HMM is described, it is logical to step into the algorithms 
which can be used to calculate the probability of hidden state in any given time 𝑡.  
Before proceeding with algorithms, it should be defined that HMM is characterized 
by three fundamental problems (Rabiner, 1989): 
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1. Likelihood - Given an HMM 𝜆 =  (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) and observation sequence 𝑂, 
determine the likelihood 𝑃 (𝑂| 𝜆). 
2. Decoding - Given an observation sequence 𝑂 and HMM 𝜆 =  (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋), 
figure out the best hidden state sequence 𝑄, where 𝑄 = 𝑞1𝑞2 … 𝑞𝑇  
3. Learning - Given an observation sequence 𝑂 and set of states in the HMM, 
learn HMM parameter 𝐴 and 𝐵. 
Our main goal in this article is to focus on the second problem as we will determine 
that based on data either transaction is suspicious or normal. Learning phase is also 
done to estimate 𝐴 and 𝐵. 
There are many decoding algorithms defined, the most well-known are Viterbi, and 
PSA (Prefix Sum Arrays) decoding algorithms. 
Viterbi algorithm - is the most often used in practice for defining the most likely 
hidden states in HMM by considering maximum likelihood probabilities for each 
state (Forney, 2005). 
Considering complete parameters 𝜆 =  (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) of HMM, Viterbi algorithm defines 
the most likely path (also called Viterbi path) in the sequence by calculating each 
likelihood probabilities of hidden states based on the observation sequence 𝑂.  
Baum-Welch algorithm - is used to solve mentioned 3rd problem of HMM and 
estimate transition and emission probabilities in the empirical part. The algorithm 
is a special case of the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (Jurafsky and 
Martin, 2008). EM is an iterative algorithm which estimates initial probabilities then 
uses those ones to get a better result, iteratively improving the probabilities. Baum-
Welch uses this feature of EM algorithm to find the maximum likelihood estimate 








3.2. K-means clustering algorithm. 
 
K-means clustering algorithm is one of the basic and most used algorithms to group 
data. This algorithm gets its name based on the logic that observations 
(𝒙1, 𝒙2, … , 𝒙𝑚), where each observation is a 𝑑 - dimensional real vector, are 
divided into 𝐾 clusters, where each observation is related to the cluster with the 
nearest mean. In empirical part, k-means algorithm is used to conclude the 
reliability of HMM by comparing results of two models. Basically, k-means 
algorithm was used in this thesis to split the transactions in datasets into 2 clusters 
- suspicious or normal, based on a set of transaction characteristics. 
According to Wu (2012), k-means clustering is a prototype-based, simple partitional 
clustering algorithm that aims to find 𝐾 non-overlapping clusters. Centroids 
represent each cluster (a cluster centroid is typically the mean of the points in that 
cluster). 
Steps in k-means algorithm can be described as follows (Hartigan and Wong, 1979): 
• Number of clusters - 𝐾 is defined. 
• Select random points from data as centroids. 
• Assign every point in the data to a cluster with the closest centroid. 
• Recompute the centroids of newly formed clusters until there is no change 
to the centroids i.e., assignment of data points to clusters is not changing.  
• Compute the sum of the squared distance between data points and their 
assigned cluster centroids.  
• Assign each data point to the closest cluster (centroid).  
• Compute the centroids for the clusters by taking the average of all data 
points that belong to each cluster. 












where 𝑤𝑖𝑘 = 1 for data point 𝑥𝑖 if it belongs to cluster 𝑘; otherwise, 𝑤𝑖𝑘 = 0, ‖ … ‖ 
is a distance, 𝝁𝑘 is the centroid of 𝒙𝑖’s cluster, 𝐾 is the number of clusters and 𝑚 is 
the number of data points. 
Above function is two-part minimization problem. Firstly, the function 𝐽 is 
minimized with respect to  𝑤𝑖𝑘 and the centroids 𝝁𝑘 are assumed to be fixed. 
Secondly, function 𝐽 is minimized with respect to centroids 𝝁𝑘 and 𝑤𝑖𝑘 is assumed 
to be fixed. In other words, function 𝐽 is differentiated with respect to 𝑤𝑖𝑘 first and 
cluster assignments updated. Then function 𝐽 is differentiated with respect to 
centroids 𝝁𝑘 and the centroids are recomputed after the cluster assignments from 
previous step. So, the  first step is solving the following equation: 
argmin𝑤𝑖𝑘 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑘‖𝒙𝑖 − 𝝁𝑘‖
2   →  𝑤𝑖𝑘 = {









It basically means assign the data point 𝒙𝒊 to the closest cluster judged by its sum 
of squared distance from cluster’s centroid. 
The second step can be mathematically expressed as: 
𝜕𝐽
𝜕𝝁𝑘











Which translates to recomputing the centroid of each cluster to reflect the new 
assignments. 
 
In the empirical part the Stats (Hartigan and Wong (1979) package was used to  




3.3. Quality assessment metrics 
 
To compare the results of selected models, we use Precision, Recall (Sensitivity), 
and F- score for comparison. 
Confusion matrix is used to give a better overview about precision and recall. 
Confusion matrix is a 2x2 table that cross-checks predictions with actual values. The 
confusion matrix provides profound information not only about the performance 
of predictive model, but also which classes are being predicted correctly, which 
incorrectly and what type of error is being made. General form of confusion matrix 


























































Figure 3. Confusion Matrix 
 
A 2x2 confusion matrix on Figure 3 has 2 states for actual values – e.g., positive 
(True) and negative (False) – and 2 states for predicted values. The result is a table 
with 4 different combinations of predicted and actual values:  
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- true positives (TP): These are cases in which we predicted positive, and 
it is true. 
- true negatives (TN): We predicted negative, and it is true.  
- false positives (FP): We predicted positive, and it is false (also known 
as "Type I error"). 
- false negatives (FN): We predicted negative, and it is false (also known 
as "Type II error"). 
 
Precision (Positive Predictive Value) turns out all positive classes how much it has 














Generally, precision is appropriate for minimizing false positives and recall is 
appropriate for minimizing false negatives. 
 
But neither precision nor recall alone gives the basis for a reliable conclusion. It is 
highly possible to get excellent precision with terrible recall or vice versa. F-score 
provides a way to handle both concerns with a single score. F-score is the harmonic 









4. Empirical Study 
 
This section gives a general overview of data and applied HMM and k-means 




Artificial data provided by Salv Technologies was used to implement HMM for 
detection of suspicious financial transactions. The data consists of a made-up 
population (persons and entities) who then perform financial transactions with 
each other. The generated financial transactions include details such as bank 
details, counterparty details, date of transaction, amount, transaction type 
(incoming or outgoing) and currency. Some transactions are generated by scripts 
that mimic money laundering transactions or scenarios. The fact if a transaction 
was generated as a “normal” or “suspicious” transaction is recorded with the data. 
In other words, the data is labelled, we know which transaction is suspicious and 
based on that we can measure the implemented HMM and k-means clustering 
models’ reliabilities and efficacies. 
 
Study case 1 - a model was set up on “training” data which contained small amount 
of the data. Overall, 5000 transactions of 10 users were analyzed and 5 transactions 
(0.1%) were “suspicious”. 
Study case 2 - a model was built only on suspicious transactions. Overall, 439 
unique users and their 6854 transactions were analyzed. 
Study case 3 - a model was built on a large dataset. Overall, 55275 transactions of 





Figure 4. Example of raw data 
 
Below are the variables that were used for analyzing data: 
• user_id - is a variable that uniquely defines the person who is one 
counteparty of the transaction within the artificial bank; 
• type - shows the direction of transaction (either outgoing or incoming); 
• Date_completed - shows the date and time when the transaction is 
completed; 
• from_cur and to_cur - variables that show currencies of the transaction; 
• amount_in_eur - amount of transaction in Euro equivalent; 
• meta_sar_id - identifies if  the transaction was deliberately generated to be 
suspicious and the ID number gives the exact scenario. In raw dataset 
“suspicious” transactions had values greater than 0, values was fixed for 
simplicity for all three study cases. If generated as normal behavior, then 
value is equal to 0. The variable is used to create a binary variable – 1 if 
suspicious, 0 if normal; 








4.2 Study Setup 
 
The main idea is that transactions are considered as either “normal” or “suspicious” 
and this fact is taken as the hidden states in the HMM. So, the state space will be 
𝑆 = {𝑆1 = normal, 𝑆2 = suspicious}. 
The next step to build HMM is to define the “observable” variable. In all three 
studies, an intermediary variable was created from a linear combination of 
transaction features that are considered risk factors in the fight against money 
laundering. This composition was taken from AML practice. The new composite 
variable was named the “score” variable. 
 
 
Table 1. Example of an auxiliary variable – “score” 
 
 
“Score” is an auxiliary numeric variable which was created based on features of 
other variables such as date of transaction, counterparty country, type of 
currencies etc. For example, if transaction is done late or early time of the day, then 
the “score” variable value is increased. Also, type of currency and transaction 
counterparty country affect the increment of “score” variable, for example if a 
transaction originates from a high-risk country, then “score” is increased. The list 
of high-risk countries (Appendix C) includes high-risk and other monitored 
jurisdictions from FATF (FATF, 2020),- list of offshore countries managed by the 
International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund, 2019) and the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2021). The components of “score” 





11028 Completed I 02-12-19 17:08 130 EUR EUR 130 0 10 
11028 Completed I 03-12-19 19:32 840.14 EUR EUR 840.14 0 10 
11032 Completed I 26-03-20 9:55 21.79 EUR EUR 21.79 0 5 
11032 Completed I 27-04-20 4:08 23023 EUR EUR 23023 1 50 
11032 Completed o 27-04-20 19:37 20797.
17 
EUR EUR 20797.17 1 55 
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are taken by rules, which are usually used in the rule-based method to detect 
money laundering and were built using domain knowledge. 
Finally, if “score” crosses a certain threshold, defined for each study  case 
separately, then the “observable” variable defines transaction as “high risk”, 
“medium risk” or “low risk”, i.e., 𝑉 = {𝑣1 = low_risk, 𝑣2 = high_risk, 𝑣3 =
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 }. The higher the value of variable “score”, the riskier the 
transaction. 
 
4.2.1. Study case 1 
 
To make analysis more reliable, additionally as mentioned in table 2, other 3 
variables created: 
• sum_1in - sum of incoming transaction amounts within 1 day for same user; 
• sum_1out - sum of outgoing transaction amounts within 1 day for same user; 





After analyzing the data, the “score” variable for study case 1 and 2 was manually 
created based on rules indicated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Formation of ““score””  variable for study cases 1 and 2 
Rules Increment of “score” 
Time Range of transaction: 
21PM-7AM 
15 
amount_in_eur>=500 amount_in_eur<1000 5 
amount_in_eur>=1000 amount_in_eur<5000 10 
32 
 
amount_in_eur>=5000 amount_in_eur<20000 15 
amount_in_eur>=20000 20 
Counterparty_risk country 10 
Currency other than USD or EUR 10 
sum_1in>=1000 and sum_1in<5000  
 
5 




sum_1out>=500 and sum_1out<1000 5 
sum_1out>=1000 and sum_1out<10000 10 
sum_1out>=10000 15 
count_1>=2 and count_1<3 5 




After estimation of “score” variable for every transaction, maximum of “score”  
variable was calculated for every user. Based on the maximum “score” variable, the 
observable variable for each transaction was calculated as follows: 
• If 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 < max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
1
2
 , then observable variable for this transaction is 
low_risk; 
• If 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≥ max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
1
2
 and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≤ max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
9
10
  then observable 
variable for this transaction is medium_risk; 
• If 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≥ max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
9
10
, then observable variable for this transaction is 
high_risk; 





Table 3 gives an overview of data with calculated “score”, maximum “score”, and 
observable variables before applying HMM. 
 










11028 O 51.5 0 15 EE 0 51.5 1 40 low_risk 
11032 I 23023 1 50 EE 23193 0 2 55 high_risk 
11032 O 20797.17 1 55 EE 23023 20887.17 4 55 high_risk 
11097 I 31258 1 55 GT 31279.5 6.24 4 55 high_risk 
15177 I 15.52 0 25 EE 97.49 31.76 5 40 medium_risk 
 
 
Last step was application of HMM to define the hidden state based on the 
observation sequence. The transition probability from “suspicious” state to 
“normal” was set a little bit higher as a person can manipulate and commit 
“normal” transactions as well. So, the model parameters were set as below: 
• Hidden states: 𝑆 = {𝑆1 = normal, 𝑆2 = suspicious}; 
• Observable values: 𝑉 = {𝑣1 = “𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘”, 𝑣2 = "medium_risk", 𝑣3 =
“ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘”}; 
• Initial probabilities:  𝜋 = {𝜋1 = 0.5,  𝜋2 = 0.5}; 
• Transition probabilities: 𝐴 = { 𝑎11 = 0.9, 𝑎12 = 0.1, 𝑎21 = 0.4, 𝑎22 = 0.6}; 
• Emission probabilities: 
𝐵 = { 𝑏1(𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) = 0.7, 𝑏1(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) = 0.25, 𝑏1(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 0.05, 
𝑏2(𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) = 0.01, 𝑏2(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) = 0.09, 𝑏2(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) = 0.9} 
 







4.2.2. Study Case 2 
 
In study case 2, only suspicious transactions were considered. 6854 transactions of 
239 users were analyzed. 
Conditions for defining observable variable for every transaction was changed after 
analyzing the data. It was identified that many transactions had a small “score” 
value in the defined dataset. So, new conditions were as follows: 
• If 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 < max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
1
3
 , then observable variable for this transaction is 
low_risk; 
• If 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≥ max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
1
3
 and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≤ max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
2
3
  then observable 
variable for this transaction is medium_risk; 
• If 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≥ max(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗
2
3
, then observable variable for this transaction is 
high_risk; 




After all was set up, the data before applying HMM looked as below in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Example of data for study 2 before application of HMM 
 

















11229 Completed I EUR EUR 4295.25 1 25 EE 5611.
24 
0 2 55 medium_risk 
11229 Completed I EUR EUR 3777 1 15 EE 3777 0 1 55 low_risk 
11229 Completed I EUR EUR 2223.46 1 15 EE 2223.
46 
0 1 55 low_risk 
11229 Completed I EUR EUR 8017.55 1 25 EE 8017.
55 
0 1 55 medium_risk 
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4.2.3. Study case 3 
 
Total of 55275 transactions of 32 users were analyzed in Study case 3 where 235 
(0.4%) transactions were suspicious. Table 5 shows the changes were done on 
estimation of “score” variables as value range of transaction amount was much 
narrower than the datasets in study 1 and study 2 cases. 
 
Table 5. Updates on “score” variable for study case 3 
 
Conditions for defining observable variable for every transaction and model 
parameters stayed the same as in study 1. 
Better transition and emission probabilities were calculated by applying Baum-
Welch algorithm, then Viterbi algorithm was used to estimate the “hidden” state 
for each transaction. The same algorithms were applied in all three study cases. It 
was defined that initial transition probabilities did not have much impact on 
defining the “hidden” states unlike initial emission probabilities. 
K-means clustering method was applied for each study case. Then HMM was 
compared with k-means clustering for each study cases separately. Quality 
assessment metrics- Precision, Recall, and F-score were used for comparison the 
results of both models. 
 
 
Conditions Increment of “score” variable 
amount_in_eur>=1000 and amount_in_eur<3000 10 
amount_in_eur>=3000 and amount_in_eur<10000 15 
amount_in_eur>=10000, 20 
sender_account=="" and counterparty_country== 
"" 





For study case 1, among 5000 transactions only 5 (0.1%) were suspicious and HMM 
correctly figured out 4 of them. Overall, 9 transactions were defined as suspicious 
by HMM and an important point is that HMM turned only those transactions as 
suspicious which got high risk in “observation” variable including identified false 
positives. Those transactions should be investigated by AML specialist further. K-
means, on the other hand, turned out huge amount of false positives - 4980  out of 
total 4985 predicted suspicious  transactions, which may take lots of investigation 
time for sorting out true positive ones. Due to having huge number of false 
positives, precision was only around 0.1% for k-means. Considering all of these it 
can be said, HMM outraced k-means in study 1. Outcome of HMM in study 1 
generalized in Figure 5. As it is seen from Figure 5 that detecting “hidden” states is 
highly dependent on type of observed variable. None of the “low risk” transactions 
turned out to be suspicious and 0.08% was in “high risk” category out of  0.1% of  
actual suspicious transactions. A huge part of “medium risk” transaction was 
predicted as normal. We can imply that HMM tended to turn out mainly “high risk” 





Figure 5. Study 1 results for HMM 
 
 
HMM showed its real reliability in Study 2 where all analyzed 6854 transactions 
were considered as suspicious. HMM correctly predicted 5771 (84%) of them as 
suspicious. As all transactions were suspicious in study 2, precision for both models 
was in its maximum. HMM falsely predicted only 16% of transactions as normal. On 
the other hand, k-means clustering predicted 5613 (82%) transactions as 
suspicious, and number of false negatives was dramatically high as being 1241 
(18%) transactions.  As a result, HMM outperformed k-means clustering in all 3 
quality assessment metrics. Outcome of HMM in study 2 generalized in Figure 6. As 
it is seen, HMM mostly turned out “high risk” transaction as suspicious. Over 59% 






Figure 6. Study 2 results for HMM 
And lastly in study 3, overall, 55275 transactions of 32 users were analyzed where 
235 transactions of 11 users were suspicious. HMM truly predicted 95 (40%) 
transactions of 9 users as suspicious. HMM incorrectly identified 83 transactions of 
5 users as suspicious which were not. But important point is that from 80 
transactions of 83 incorrectly defined transactions were categorized as “high risk” 
transactions. Those transactions should be investigated further. In contrast, k-
means clustering predicted 54537 transactions falsely as suspicious which 
significantly lowered precision and F-score for the model, despite of having higher 
recall than HMM. To sum up, it can also be concluded that HMM outperformed k-
means in terms of reliability in study 3. Overview of HMM in study 3 in terms of 
riskiness, feature and state of transactions was given in table 6. As it is seen from 





Table 6. Study 3 results for HMM 
Meta Sar Id Observation normal suspicious 
0 
high_risk 308 80 
low_risk 47,943 0 
medium_risk 6,706 3 
1 
high_risk 20 67 
low_risk 29 0 
medium_risk 91 28 
 
The all results of quality assessment metrics for each study were summed up in 
table 7.  
 











Results Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
HMM K-means HMM K-means Hmm K-means 
Precision 
 
44% 0.1% 100% 100% 53% 0.003% 
Recall 
 
80% 100% 84% 82% 40% 78% 
F-Score 
 




The purpose of the thesis was to introduce, build and test HMM as a method of 
detecting suspicious transaction which might be correlated with money laundering. 
The model was built and tested on artificial datasets and commonly used k-means 
clustering model was chosen for comparison. 
The thesis gives an overview about money laundering, anomaly detection methods 
used for detecting suspicious activity in various fields and profound summary of 
hidden Markov model. HMM was analyzed in 3 three different study cases. In total, 
more than 70000 transactions were used to test the HMM. As a benchmark k-
means clustering was also applied and both models were compared with each 
other. Quality of models was concluded based on assessment metrics such as 
precision, recall, F-score. In all three studies HMM showed better results in terms 
of precision and F-score. As suspicious transactions were randomly generated in 
artificial datasets, some of them did not fit any logic as being suspicious. But despite 
of this discrepancy, HMM performed quite well. 
The most important part for HMM is the composition of “score” variable as it 
defines the “observable” variable. And based on “observable” variable states are 
defined. It was realized that HMM mostly tended to identify “high risk” transactions 
as suspicious. Another important point is the setting up initial emission 
probabilities. Studies showed that initial emission probabilities have a huge impact 
on defining “hidden” states. So, formation of the “score”  variable and setting up 
initial emission probabilities are very sensitive, and they should be carefully created 
according to the features of transactions.  But for better and much reliable HMM, 
the formation of “score” variable could be constantly reviewed, and several 
observable levels could be added.   
Based on analysis, it can be concluded that in essence, HMM can be accepted as a 
good model in transaction monitoring but getting high precision needs expert 
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NROW(unique(all_dd$user_id))#10 users and 5 transaction is suspicious.0.1% of all 5000 
transaction is suspicious 
 
 
#defining conditions and adding new variable score 
 
all_dd[,score:=0] #creating empty score column 
all_dd[as.ITime(date_completed)<=as.ITime('07:00:00'),score:=score+15 ] 
all_dd[as.ITime(date_completed)>=as.ITime('21:00:00'),score:=score+15] 
all_dd[amount_in_eur>=500 & amount_in_eur<1000, score:=score+5] 
all_dd[amount_in_eur>=1000 & amount_in_eur<5000, score:=score+10] 







                                     
'DO','EC','ER','ET','GH','GI','WG','GT','GG','DW','GY','HK','IR',  
                                     
'IQ','IM','JA','JE','KE','LA','LB','LR','LY','MO','PT-30','MV','MH',  
                                     
'MU','MS','MZ','MM','NA','NR','NC','NU','PK','PW','PS','PA','SC','RU',  
                                     
'WS','RS','SX','SO','SS','LK','SH','KN','PM','VC','SD','SZ','SY','PF', 
                                     
'TL','TO','TT','TN','TC','UG','UY','VU','VE','VG','VI','YE'),  
       score:=score+5] 
 
 
all_dd[to_cur!='EUR'& to_cur!='USD', score:=score+10] 
all_dd[from_cur!='EUR'& from_cur!='USD', score:=score+10] 
 
#creating additional variables sum_1in,sum_1out and count_1 
   
all_dd[,sum_1in:=0] # sum of amount in eur in last 1 days for incoming transactions 
   
all_dd[,sum_1out:=0] # sum of amount in eur in last 1 days for outgoing transactions 
 






for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd)) { 
     
    all_dd$sum_1in[i]=sum(all_dd[difftime(all_dd$date_completed[i], date_completed,  
                                  units='days')<=1 
&(date_completed<=date_completed[i])&(user_id[i]==user_id) & type=='I',  
                         amount_in_eur])} 
  for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd)){ 
    all_dd$sum_1out[i]=sum(all_dd[difftime(all_dd$date_completed[i], date_completed,  
                                   units='days')<=1 
&(date_completed<=date_completed[i])&(all_dd$user_id[i]==user_id) & type=='O',  
                          amount_in_eur])} 
  for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd)){ 
    all_dd$count_1[i]=length(all_dd[difftime(all_dd$date_completed[i], date_completed,  
                                     
units='days')<=1&(date_completed<=date_completed[i])&(all_dd$user_id[i]==user_id) , 
amount_in_eur 
    ])} 
   
 
#analyzing sum_1in,sum_1out and count_1 
summary(all_dd$sum_1in) 




all_dd[sum_1in>=1000 & sum_1in<5000, score:=score+5] 
all_dd[sum_1in>=5000 & sum_1in<10000, score:=score+10] 
all_dd[sum_1in>=10000 , score:=score+15] 
all_dd[sum_1out>=500 & sum_1out<1000, score:=score+5] 
all_dd[sum_1out>=1000 & sum_1out<10000, score:=score+10] 
all_dd[sum_1out>=10000 , score:=score+15] 
all_dd[count_1>=3 & count_1<5, score:=score+5] 
all_dd[count_1>=5 & count_1<10, score:=score+10] 
all_dd[count_1>=10 , score:=score+15] 
 
 
 #creating max_score which is max score for each user_id 
max_score=all_dd[,max_score:=0] 
  for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd)){all_dd$max_score[i]= 
max(all_dd[all_dd$user_id[i]==user_id,score])} # maximum score for person 
 
 
#creating observable variable 
 all_dd[score<max_score*1/2 | max_score==0, observation:='low_risk'] 
 all_dd[score>=max_score*1/2 & score< max_score*9/10 , observation:='medium_risk'] 












#defining parameters for HHM 
  states <- c("normal", "susp") # define the names of the states 
  normprobs <- c(0.9, 0.1) # set the probabilities of switching states, where the 
previous state was "normal"#does not matter 
   
  suspprobs <- c(0.4, 0.6) # set the probabilities of switching states, where the 
previous state was "susp" 
   
  thetransitionmatrix <- matrix(c(normprobs, suspprobs), 2, 2, byrow = 
                                  TRUE) # create a 2 x 2 matrix 
  rownames(thetransitionmatrix) <- states 
  colnames(thetransitionmatrix) <- states 
  observations <- c("low_risk","medium_risk","high_risk") # define the alphabet of 
observations 
   
  normstateprobs <- c(0.7,0.25,0.05) # set the values of the emission probabilities, for 
the normal state 
   
  suspstateprobs <- c(0.01,0.09,0.9) # set the values of the emission probabilities,for 
the susp state  
   
  theemissionmatrix <- matrix(c(normstateprobs, suspstateprobs),2, 3,  
                              byrow = TRUE) # Create a 2 x 3 matrix 
  rownames(theemissionmatrix) <- states 
  colnames(theemissionmatrix) <- observations 
  myseq<- all_dd$observation # create a vector of observable variable 
  #initialization HMM 
  hmm = initHMM(c("normal","susp"),observations, 
                transProbs=thetransitionmatrix, 
                emissionProbs=theemissionmatrix) 
  # Baum-Welch algorithm for updating transition and emission probabilities 
   
  bw = baumWelch(hmm,myseq,5) 
  thetransitionmatrix<-bw$hmm$transProbs 
  theemissionmatrix<-bw$hmm$emissionProbs 
# using Viterbi algorithm to predict state for every transaction 
 
res=viterbi(hmm,myseq)#getting the hidden states based on most probable path by using 
built in viterbi algorithm of HMM package 
 
 





#Results   






#Applying Kmeans on dataset 
 
Xkmeans=all_dd%>%select(amount_in_eur,score,max_score,sum_1in,sum_1out)#taking into 
account 4 variables 
 
 








TPHMM=nrow(all_dd[meta_sar_id>0&states=="susp"])#4    #True positives 
FPHMM=nrow(all_dd[meta_sar_id==0&states=="susp"])#5  #False positives 







































nrow(all_dd_s)#6854 suspicious transactions of 439 users 
NROW(unique(all_dd_s$user_id))#439 unique users all suspicious 
 
#setting up the rules for score 
all_dd_s[,score:=0] #creating empty score column 
all_dd_s[as.ITime(date_completed)<=as.ITime('07:00:00'),score:=score+15 ] 
all_dd_s[as.ITime(date_completed)>=as.ITime('21:00:00'),score:=score+15] 
all_dd_s[amount_in_eur>=500 & amount_in_eur<1000, score:=score+5] 
all_dd_s[amount_in_eur>=1000 & amount_in_eur<5000, score:=score+10] 







                                   
'DO','EC','ER','ET','GH','GI','WG','GT','GG','DW','GY','HK','IR',  
                                   'IQ','IM','JA','JE','KE','LA','LB','LR','LY','MO','PT-
30','MV','MH',  
                                   
'MU','MS','MZ','MM','NA','NR','NC','NU','PK','PW','PS','PA','SC','RU',  
                                   
'WS','RS','SX','SO','SS','LK','SH','KN','PM','VC','SD','SZ','SY','PF', 
                                   
'TL','TO','TT','TN','TC','UG','UY','VU','VE','VG','VI','YE'),  
       score:=score+5] 
 
all_dd_s[to_cur!='EUR'& to_cur!='USD', score:=score+10] 
all_dd_s[from_cur!='EUR'& from_cur!='USD', score:=score+10] 
 
#creating additional variables sum_1in,sum_1out and count_1 
 
all_dd_s[,sum_1in:=0] # sum of amount in eur in last 1 days for incoming transactions 
 
all_dd_s[,sum_1out:=0] # sum of amount in eur in last 1 days for outgoing transactions 
 
all_dd_s[,count_1:=0] # count of transaction in last 1 days 
for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd_s)) { 
   
  all_dd_s$sum_1in[i]=sum(all_dd_s[difftime(all_dd_s$date_completed[i], date_completed,  
                                        units='days')<=1 
&(date_completed<=date_completed[i])&(user_id[i]==user_id) & type=='I',  
                               amount_in_eur])} 
for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd_s)){ 
  all_dd_s$sum_1out[i]=sum(all_dd_s[difftime(all_dd_s$date_completed[i], date_completed,  
                                         units='days')<=1 
&(date_completed<=date_completed[i])&(all_dd_s$user_id[i]==user_id) & type=='O',  
                                amount_in_eur])} 
for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd_s)){ 
  all_dd_s$count_1[i]=length(all_dd_s[difftime(all_dd_s$date_completed[i], 
date_completed,                                        
units='days')<=1&(date_completed<=date_completed[i])&(all_dd_s$user_id[i]==user_id) , 
amount_in_eur 




#analyzing sum_1in,sum_1out and count_1 
summary(all_dd_s$sum_1in) 
summary(all_dd_s$sum_1out)   
summary(all_dd_s$count_1) 
 
# conditions for score 
all_dd_s[sum_1in>=1000 & sum_1in<5000, score:=score+5] 
all_dd_s[sum_1in>=5000 & sum_1in<10000, score:=score+10] 
all_dd_s[sum_1in>=10000 , score:=score+15] 
all_dd_s[sum_1out>=500 & sum_1out<1000, score:=score+5] 
all_dd_s[sum_1out>=1000 & sum_1out<10000, score:=score+10] 
all_dd_s[sum_1out>=10000 , score:=score+15] 
all_dd_s[count_1>=3 & count_1<5, score:=score+5] 
all_dd_s[count_1>=5 & count_1<10, score:=score+10] 
all_dd_s[count_1>=10 , score:=score+15] 
 
 
#creating max_score_s which is max score for each user_id 
max_score_s=all_dd_s[,max_score_s:=0] 
for (i in 1:nrow(all_dd_s)){all_dd_s$max_score_s[i]= 





#creating observable variable 
all_dd_s[score<max_score_s*1/3 | max_score_s==0, observation:='low_risk'] 
all_dd_s[score>=max_score_s*1/3 & score< max_score_s*2/3 , observation:='medium_risk'] 
all_dd_s[score>=max_score_s*2/3, observation:='high_risk'] 
 
##Setting up HMM 
 
states <- c("normal", "susp") # define the names of the states 
normprobs <- c(0.9, 0.1) # set the probabilities of switching states, where the previous 
state was "normal"#does not matter 
 
suspprobs <- c(0.4, 0.6) # set the probabilities of switching states, where the previous 
state was "susp" 
 
thetransitionmatrix <- matrix(c(normprobs, suspprobs), 2, 2, byrow = 
                                TRUE) # create a 2 x 2 matrix 
rownames(thetransitionmatrix) <- states 
colnames(thetransitionmatrix) <- states 
observations <- c("low_risk","medium_risk","high_risk") # define the alphabet of 
observations 
 
normstateprobs <- c(0.7,0.25,0.05) # set the values of the emission probabilities, for 
the normal state 
 
suspstateprobs <- c(0.01,0.09,0.9) # set the values of the emission probabilities,for the 
susp state  
theemissionmatrix <- matrix(c(normstateprobs, suspstateprobs),2, 3,  
                            byrow = TRUE) # Create a 2 x 3 matrix 
rownames(theemissionmatrix) <- states 
colnames(theemissionmatrix) <- observations 





hmm = initHMM(c("normal","susp"),observations, 
              transProbs=thetransitionmatrix, 
              emissionProbs=theemissionmatrix) 
# Baum-Welch algorithm for updating transition and emission probabilities 
 
bw = baumWelch(hmm,myseq,5) 
thetransitionmatrix<-bw$hmm$transProbs 
theemissionmatrix<-bw$hmm$emissionProbs 
# using Viterbi algorithm to predict state for every transaction 
 
res=viterbi(hmm,myseq)#getting the hidden states based on most probable path by using 
built in viterbi algorithm of HMM package 
 
## 




#Results  of HMM  




TPHMM_s=nrow(all_dd_s[meta_sar_id>0&states=="susp"])#5771    #True positives 
TPHMM_s 
 
FPHMM_s=nrow(all_dd_s[meta_sar_id==0&states=="susp"])#0  #False positives 
FPHMM_s 
 












F_scoreHMM_s  # 0.9142178 
 
Application and results of K means 
  
 ##Kmeans, for study 2 as all transactions were suspicious we assume that kmeans assumes 
transactions as suspicious in highest number of cluster. 
 Xkmeans=all_dd_s%>%select(amount_in_eur,score,max_score_s,sum_1in,sum_1out)#taking into 



































nrow(transaction[meta_sar_id>0])#235 suspicious transactions overall 
nrow(transaction)#55275 overall, 0.425147 % suspicious transaction in dataset 
 
transaction[,score:=0] #creating empty score column 
transaction[as.ITime(date_completed)<=as.ITime('09:00:00'),score:=score+15 ] 
transaction[as.ITime(date_completed)>=as.ITime('21:00:00'),score:=score+15] 
transaction[amount_in_eur>=500 & amount_in_eur<1000, score:=score+5] 
transaction[amount_in_eur>=1000 & amount_in_eur<3000, score:=score+10] 







                               
'DO','EC','ER','ET','GH','GI','WG','GT','GG','DW','GY','HK','IR',  
                               'IQ','IM','JA','JE','KE','LA','LB','LR','LY','MO','PT-
30','MV','MH',  
                               
'MU','MS','MZ','MM','NA','NR','NC','NU','PK','PW','PS','PA','SC','RU',  
                               
'WS','RS','SX','SO','SS','LK','SH','KN','PM','VC','SD','SZ','SY','PF', 
                               
'TL','TO','TT','TN','TC','UG','UY','VU','VE','VG','VI','YE'),  
   score:=score+5] 
 
 
transaction[to_cur!='EUR'& to_cur!='USD', score:=score+10] 







##creating max score for each user 
max_score=transaction[,max_score:=0] #new column 
 
for (i in 1:nrow(transaction)){transaction$max_score[i]= 




#creating observable variable  
transaction[score<max_score*1/2 | max_score==0, observation:='low_risk'] 




states <- c("normal", "susp") # define the names of the states 
normprobs <- c(0.9, 0.1) # set the probabilities of switching states, where the previous 
state was "normal" 
 
suspprobs <- c(0.4, 0.6) # set the probabilities of switching states, where the previous 
state was "susp" 
 
thetransitionmatrix <- matrix(c(normprobs, suspprobs), 2, 2, byrow = 
                                TRUE) # create a 2 x 2 matrix 
rownames(thetransitionmatrix) <- states 
colnames(thetransitionmatrix) <- states 
observations <- c("low_risk","medium_risk" ,"high_risk") # define the alphabet of 
observations 
 
normstateprobs <- c(0.7,0.25,0.05) # set the values of the emission probabilities, for 
the normal state 
 
suspstateprobs <- c(0.01,0.09,0.9) # set the values of the emission probabilities,for the 
susp state  
 
theemissionmatrix <- matrix(c(normstateprobs, suspstateprobs), 2, 3,  
                            byrow = TRUE) # Create a 2 x 3 matrix 
rownames(theemissionmatrix) <- states 
colnames(theemissionmatrix) <- observations 




hmm = initHMM(c("normal","susp"),observations, 
              transProbs=thetransitionmatrix, 
              emissionProbs=theemissionmatrix) 
 
 
# Baum-Welch algorithm for updating transition and emission probabilities 
 




# using Viterbi algorithm to predict state for every transaction 
res=viterbi(hmm,myseq) 
 




#coding all susp. transaction as 1 in meta_sar_id 
transaction$meta_sar_id=(transaction$meta_sar_id != 0)*1 
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